Believing Based on Testimony

In our era of hyper-specialization, we often accept various claims based on the testimony of others. This practice, referred to by philosophers as “believing on the basis of testimony,” is a normal and, according to philosophers, an ‘epistemically virtuous’ approach.

When we accept something as true due to another person's presentation, it’s not irrational. For instance, I believe that a water molecule consists of three atoms—H2O—because my high school science instructor taught me so, despite not having personally observed these atoms.

If this seems overly simplistic, consider the advantages of organizing knowledge in this manner. A community that practices mutual acceptance of each other’s claims can learn far more than individuals who insist on only believing what they discover independently.

However, it’s crucial not to uncritically accept everything that is said to us.

1. Consider the who delivering the message, and
2. Why they are saying it. For instance, it is prudent to be skeptical about the testimony of someone selling a Volvo who is incentivized to misrepresent its quality.
3. It's also essential to evaluate what is being claimed. Rationality calls for caution if a claim starkly contradicts established knowledge. Philosopher Regina Rini humorously illustrates this: if a new acquaintance claims to have seen a squirrel steal a park-goer’s pizza, I’ll believe her. But if she asserts that a squirrel stole a police officer’s gun and robbed a bank, I’ll require further proof.

If the who, why, and what of a claim don’t raise any red flags, we generally accept the testimony from others, which is justifiable—until this practice is abused.

Fast and Slow

To gain insight into how testimony operates, its connection to fake news, and why it's often a rational approach to constructing our understanding of reality, we can explore cognitive psychology.

In the 1980s, psychologists Richard Petty and John Cacioppo demonstrated that individuals acquire beliefs through one of two distinct cognitive pathways—akin to Daniel Kahneman's well-known Thinking, Fast and Slow.

In certain situations, we engage the “central route,” where we diligently explore the facts. For example, if I decide to find a new stereo by spending weeks researching online and consulting audiophile friends, I’m employing the central route.

In other cases, as Farhad Manjoo elaborates in his insightful book True Enough:

Instead of sifting through extensive data, you may simply opt for a Volvo because Consumer Reports rates it highly. This reflects the alternate cognitive pathway, termed the peripheral route, where we rely on “cues”—like emotional responses or endorsements from experts or celebrities—to guide our decisions.

Thus, I might choose a Volkswagen because my friends own one, a Hummer because Arnold Schwarzenegger endorses it, or a Tesla because of its association with cannabis culture.

Remember: peripheral processing relies on cues, which is a vital concept.

Rationally Taking the Shortcut

As the volume of information grows, our ability to distinguish relevant data from the irrelevant diminishes. When expert commentary is absent, we often find ourselves overwhelmed by a deluge of facts stripped of meaning.

In such circumstances, it’s reasonable to let the peripheral route take precedence when the complexities become too daunting.

Why wouldn’t it be?

When we simply can’t grasp the intricacies of a situation, when the sheer volume of data and various ‘-isms’ become overwhelming, or when we lack the motivation to scrutinize everything, believing someone who appears knowledgeable and speaks in a manner we find agreeable seems perfectly justifiable.

Consumer Reports has the means to evaluate every car on the market, while we do not. So when the magazine advocates for a Volvo, we listen. This isn’t necessarily a poor strategy; after all, how often is Consumer Reports wrong in their product assessments? Rarely, or it wouldn’t have the esteemed reputation it holds.

The essence of utilizing the peripheral route is to construct a comprehensive understanding of reality, addressing questions that would otherwise require excessive effort to investigate independently.

Do you know how many academic papers exist on climate change? A vast number. Must you have reviewed a significant portion to have a well-founded opinion during casual discussions? I hope not!

Why does this matter? It implies that our reluctance to fact-check everything we encounter cannot solely explain why "crazy fairy tales have become increasingly common." Peripheral processing has served us well for years. Simply urging individuals to “think for themselves” isn’t the solution; that level of radical intellectual independence is unrealistic.

A more intricate issue is at play.

Complexity

Next, we need to explore what influences whether people engage in central or peripheral processing.

Typically, the peripheral route is taken when we aim to save time or are presented with challenges beyond our capability to resolve.

Economist Tyler Cowen suggests that the most significant recent change in Western society has been the substantial decrease in the cost and inconvenience of accessing information. While this data empowers us, granting insights into domains that were once exclusive to experts, we need not rely solely on our chemistry teacher’s statements about water or our pastor’s views on the earth’s age or the UN’s climate theories.

If desired, one could always opt for the central route.

To identify flaws in such analyses, this is your only viable option. You must delve into the substance of the arguments, familiarize yourself with chemistry, geology, and biology, and independently investigate how their predictions align with actual data. Only through such diligence can some of these arguments potentially falter (or not).

But who actually undertakes all this?

Certainly, no one. We resort to the peripheral route, which means, as Manjoo noted, we depend on cues.

To summarize, when processing information peripherally, we rely on cues for assessment. We choose the peripheral route when faced with excessive or overly complex data. This precisely describes our current situation.

And this has significant repercussions.

Dependency and Vulnerability

As we conclude our detour, we must reintroduce the essential role of testimony in light of our reliance on cues.

As the controversies shaping our lives become increasingly intricate, and as complex information from beyond our expertise inundates public discourse, understanding the world often relies on expert perspectives.

In an age of hyper-specialization, we must trust one another. Modern knowledge hinges on lengthy chains of expertise, meaning we have no choice but to rely on each other. This dependence on testimony—claims made by others—has substantially increased, rendering us vulnerable: since the relevant facts often elude us, experts can sometimes mask a lack of factual support for a given “truth” as a matter of authority.

“You wouldn’t understand.”

If you were to scrutinize your most cherished beliefs about the world, you would likely uncover an expert underpinning those views. What, for example, informs your stance on the dangers of global warming, the business potential of Apple, or your belief in the molecular structure of water?

Philosopher Elijah Millgram argues in The Great Endarkenment that contemporary knowledge relies on trusting extensive networks of experts. No single individual can verify the credibility of every link in that chain. Ask yourself: can you distinguish a competent statistician from an incompetent one? A qualified biologist from a subpar one? A proficient nuclear engineer, radiologist, or macro-economist from a less skilled counterpart?

This vulnerability and the necessity for trust can be manipulated. The cues we prioritize may not necessarily lead us toward the truth. Peripheral processing inherently invites biases in determining which expert we choose to trust.

In the remainder of this essay, I will illustrate that those who appear to have lost all concern for facts are not irrational, but rather misled about where to place their trust. Their strategy of peripheral processing is being exploited.

How to Determine Where to Place Your Trust?

Given that we cannot verify every expert in our network, we must pose a crucial follow-up question regarding the psychology behind the dissemination of fake news: Can we at least identify who not to listen to?

If we cannot ascertain who is right, can we at least identify who is likely to be right or trustworthy?

Recall the three criteria for accepting the claims of others: (i) who the person is (likely trustworthy or not), (ii) what their motivations are (is she merely praising a Volvo because she aims to sell it?), and (iii) whether her assertions align with your existing understanding of reality (no, this car cannot fly).

People are attempting to manipulate these assessments.

They seek to gain your trust despite lacking merit. They aim to convince you of their claims, even when those claims violate one of the three norms for accepting testimony. Consequently, they strive to present their statements in a manner that appears to fulfill the criteria of who, why, and what, even when they do not.

Unfortunately, they often succeed at this. As a result, our standard practices for determining trustworthiness can mislead us.

Rather than a sudden loss of interest in facts, this shift helps explain why “crazy fairy tales have become increasingly prevalent.”

For example, large data sets might seem credible, but they often lead us down the peripheral route. To non-experts, numbers can be presented as laden with significance, while in reality, they may indicate nothing noteworthy. In Is Most Published Research Wrong?, Veritasium compellingly elucidates this, referencing a notorious 2005 paper by a Stanford physicist, which argues that most published research findings are, in fact, false.

An abundance of statistics? A white coat? A journal reference? A claim that isn’t too outlandish? No sales pitch involved? If these norms for accepting testimony are met, and the peripheral cues signal approval, we may accept something as true simply because this individual stated so.

Congratulations: you have been misled into believing something likely false.

That’s just one example; the spread of fake news follows a similar pattern.

Exploiting a Reasonable Practice (or, the Tragedy of the Epistemic Commons)

Now more than ever, we are compelled to accept numerous claims based on (expert) testimony. Typically, we grant credence to others' testimony, all else being equal, especially when peripheral cues indicate approval.

However, as previously noted, it has also become increasingly easier to exploit the current landscape and take advantage of the vulnerabilities presented by a multi-media, multi-expert world to circumvent our defenses.

Individuals masquerading as experts and abusing our trust exploit gaps in otherwise reasonable norms of information processing.

They function as social parasites on our unavoidable vulnerabilities, capitalizing on our epistemic condition and social dependencies.

The Psychology Behind the Spread of Fake News

This sheds light on those individuals who seem to accept bizarre beliefs, such as the notion that Obama is a covert Muslim or the Pizzagate conspiracy. They appear to have lost all interest in evidence or inquiry, drifting away from reasoned thought.

However, the underlying reality is more complex than it seems.

As we've repeatedly demonstrated, the roles of experts, trust, testimony, and reliance on chains of authority are crucial in determining what we accept as truth. Ultimately, our understanding cannot begin from a blank slate; we must start with assumptions and trust in others.

Consider, for instance, a thought experiment involving someone raised entirely within a Deep State echo chamber.

This child has been indoctrinated with the beliefs of the echo chamber, relying solely on media channels and experts who align with her tribe’s perspective. This dynamic makes sense; it's akin to how we might reject claims about flying cars or a squirrel robbing a bank—those assertions are simply too far removed from our established understanding of reality. In a similar vein, she suspends acceptance of claims after assessing the trustworthiness of each source, based on her own foundational beliefs.

Her ostensibly ‘post-truth’ stance can thus be understood as a consequence of manipulated trust resulting in peculiar foundational beliefs.

Her sincere efforts at intellectual inquiry are misguided by her upbringing and the social structure surrounding her. Because of her Deep State ideology, she will dismiss any credible theories regarding events like 9/11 or the assassination of John F. Kennedy as false, perceiving any evidence presented as untrustworthy. These Deep State beliefs have permeated her entire belief system and evaluative framework.

Consequently, we can attribute her tendency to accept fake news to being “in the wrong chain” rather than personal failings.

According to this ‘bottom-up’ perspective, “unreasonable” individuals have not ceased to care about reality, truth, or evidence. Instead, their evaluative framework—specifically, their background beliefs about whom to trust—are fundamentally flawed from the outset. They are not irrational; they are systematically misinformed about where to place their trust.

To elucidate why people embrace bizarre beliefs, there is no need to resort to assumptions about their intelligence or rationality.

We need not concoct theories of a complete disinterest in facts, evidence, or reason to explain the rising prevalence of seemingly nonsensical ideas. We simply need to recognize that certain communities possess vastly different sets of trusted authorities, combine that with the cognitive science of central and peripheral processing, acknowledge the inevitability of trust and belief based on testimony in knowledge formation, and observe the widespread manipulation of this vulnerability.

I leave you with this task proposed by philosopher Thi Nguyen:

Listen to how it genuinely sounds when individuals reject clear facts—it does not resonate as sheer irrationality.

One faction presents a piece of economic data; the opposing side counters by discrediting the source. They perceive that newspaper as biased or regard the academic elites generating the data as corrupt. An echo chamber does not obliterate its members’ interest in truth; rather, it skillfully manipulates whom they trust and alters their acceptance of credible sources and institutions.

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