The recent discourse surrounding Trump and the Supreme Court has raised eyebrows, particularly with the notion that a sitting president may not be criminally liable for actions taken during the execution of their core duties. This perspective is reminiscent of Richard Nixon’s controversial assertions during his 1977 interview with David Frost.

In that interview, Nixon articulated a concerning viewpoint about presidential power. He suggested that when a president acts in what they deem to be in the nation's best interest, even if those actions are unlawful, such actions can be considered legal. He stated, "Well, when the president does it that means that it is not illegal," implying that presidential decisions could circumvent the law if justified by national security or internal order.

This line of reasoning was met with skepticism and ridicule, particularly in the aftermath of Watergate, where Nixon was ultimately held accountable, contrary to his claims. As I delved into legal studies, I began to comprehend the implications of Nixon's assertion more profoundly. Both Nixon and Trump argue that Congress lacks the authority to regulate essential presidential actions. Thus, if a statute criminalizes certain behaviors for an average citizen, those same actions by the president could be exempt if performed as part of their core duties.

However, in the context of the ongoing case, Trump v. US, this argument falters. The actions taken by Trump cannot be classified as falling within the realm of presidential power. Trump's legal representative, John Sauer, referenced President Grant's historical actions in 1876 as a precedent. Sauer claimed that Grant's deployment of federal troops to ensure the certification of Republican electors constituted an exercise of presidential duty.

Yet, this interpretation is flawed. Grant's actions were underpinned by the Enforcement Act of 1871, which empowered him to act against groups like the Ku Klux Klan to safeguard the election process. Trump's endeavors to create alternative elector slates in 2020 do not align with any federal mandate or constitutional authority. Therefore, Trump's actions cannot be deemed official.

The Supreme Court should unequivocally state that while a president exercising core powers may be shielded from congressional regulation, Trump’s actions concerning the electors were not within the scope of presidential duties. Hence, he lacks the immunity typically granted to a president acting in an official capacity.

This oversight is symptomatic of a broader misunderstanding regarding the delineation of presidential powers in relation to the electoral process. Neither Congress nor the President has constitutional authority over how electors are selected or how their votes are cast. The Electoral Count Acts, while they may imply otherwise, are essentially procedural agreements by Congress.

In light of this, the Supreme Court's opinion must clarify that Trump's attempts to influence the electoral process do not constitute official acts deserving of immunity.

Update: Recent inquiries regarding Fitzgerald v. Nixon (1982) suggest a different conclusion, but this is not the case. The government distinguishes Fitzgerald as a civil case rather than a criminal one. Nonetheless, even within that framework, Trump’s actions do not qualify as "official acts." Fitzgerald recognized Nixon's immunity for actions related to his official duties, which Trump's actions clearly are not.

In summary, Trump's engagement in matters related to electors and the election process lacks any connection to his official responsibilities as president. His actions, therefore, do not warrant any claims of presidential immunity.